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ABSTRACT 
This article aims to suggest a framework for understanding the interaction between the right 
to equality and the right to privacy. It does so with specific reference to the case-law of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Supreme Court of the United States 
(SCOTUS). First, the different origins of equality and privacy, as well as the link between these 
two concepts, are traced in theory. Second, examples are drawn from the case-law of the 
ECtHR and SCOTUS, with a view to illustrating the exact parameters of the interaction 
between equality and privacy in practice. This doctrinal analysis focuses mainly on the issue of 
legal treatment of same-sex relationships. Third, the ancient Greek notion of isotimia is put 
forward as a way to unravel the knot created by equality and privacy; that is, as a way to 
understand properly their relationship. 
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Mapping the conceptual labyrinths generated by the notions of equality and privacy is 
certainly not an easy task.1 But hard as it might be –if at all desirable- to agree on the exact 
parameters of either concept, a strong link between them has emerged time and again both 
in theory and in the practice of human rights adjudication. This paper aims to map that link 
under the light of the approach adopted by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
and the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) in relation to the legal treatment of 
same-sex relationships. At the outset, a conceptual inquiry is undertaken to demonstrate 
the link between equality and privacy in theory. This is followed by a doctrinal analysis, 
drawing examples from the case-law of the ECtHR and the SCOTUS, with a view to exploring 
how equality and privacy interact in practice. The final section engages in a normative 
analysis, suggesting that the right to privacy has been instrumental in enhancing our 
understanding of the right to equality; but also that the time has come to unravel the knot 
created by the two rights, to discern their distinctiveness in clearer terms. The ancient Greek 
notion of isotimia as a specific manifestation of the right to equality is put forward as the 
key to doing so.   
 
2. EQUALITY AND PRIVACY: A CONCEPTUAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
A. Different origins and a common trait 
                                                          
* Lecturer in Law, School of Law, University of Essex (hnikol@essex.ac.uk).  
1 For an overview of some of the complex debates that have surrounded the two concepts, see Louis P. 
Pojman and Robert Westmoreland (eds), Equality: Selected Readings (1997) and Ferdinand D. Schoeman, 
Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (1984). 
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There is a certain paradox which lies at the very core of our understanding of equality and 
privacy. Albeit both notions are widely recognised as enshrining a fundamental right, they 
have both been attacked on the grounds that they constitute abstractions which attach to 
other values in order to acquire substance. For instance, a well-known critique of the right 
to equality is that equal treatment draws its appeal from external values, thus being an 
‘empty idea’.2 This is so because treating like cases alike is logically impossible unless we rely 
on external factors with reference to which such treatment is to take place. Similarly, the 
right to privacy has been analysed as ‘derivative’ in the sense that it encapsulates a cluster 
of rights that overlaps with those attaching to one’s ownership of their person and their 
property.3 These criticisms stem from the fact that there does not appear to be a single 
understanding of the core meaning of either equality or privacy, although the two rights 
continue to play an important role in human rights discourse. In examining why this is the 
case, perhaps it is best to start by looking into the foundations upon which our modern 
perception of equality and privacy has evolved. 
     On the one hand, the need for equality has been linked traditionally to the idea that a 
just distribution of tangible or intangible benefits requires like cases to be treated alike.4 The 
characteristics which are relevant for the purpose of assessing likeness or unlikeness may be 
determined with reference to the benefit or the burden that is being distributed. So, to use 
a millennia-old example, the best flutes should be given to the best flute players and not to 
the most handsome ones; and the ability to move fast may be used as a criterion in 
declaring the winners of gymnastics competitions, but not in allocating offices of State.5 
That is so because the grounds for any distinction must be rational and impartial; and in the 
absence of such rationality and impartiality, the distinction will be arbitrary.6 To allow such 
arbitrary treatment in the public sphere would be to jeopardise equality before the law in 
particular and the administration of justice in general by fostering unpredictability and a 
sense of favouritism within the legal order.  
     On the other hand, the need for privacy may be said to emanate from the idea that ‘[t]he 
distinction between what an individual exposes to public view and what he conceals or 
exposes only to intimates is essential to permit creatures as complex as ourselves to interact 
without social breakdown’.7 Indeed, it is fair to argue that all of us are entitled to keep some 
aspects of our life –tangible or intangible- away from the public eye and share them only 
with those we choose and in the way we choose. It is that classic exposition of the right ‘to 
be let alone’ that has informed the evolution of our understanding of privacy since the very 
early days of the debate.8 Just as everyone is entitled to protect their property from external 
                                                          
2 See Peter Westen, ‘The Empty Idea of Equality’ (1982) 95 Harvard Law Review 537. 
3 See Judith Jarvis Thomson, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1975) 4 Philosophy & Public Affairs 295 at 306 and 312-314; 
cf. Thomas Scanlon, ‘Thomson on Privacy’ (1975) 4 Philosophy & Public Affairs 315 at 319.  
4 See Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, translated by Sir David Ross, revised with an introduction and notes 
by Lesley Brown (2009); the great philosopher observed in Chapters II and III of Book V that ‘in distributions of 
honour or money or the other things that fall to be divided among those who have a share in the constitution 
… this is the origin of quarrels and complaints – when either equals have and are awarded unequal shares, or 
unequals equal shares’ (at 84-85). 
5 See Aristotle, Politics, translated by Ernest Barker, revised with an introduction and notes by R.F. Stalley 
(1998), Chapter XII, Book III at 113-114.  
6 To use the words of Bernard Williams, ‘for every difference in the way men are treated, some general reason 
or principle of differentiation must be given’: see Bernard Williams, Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 
1956-1972 (1973) at 231. 
7 Thomas Nagel, Concealment and Exposure and other Essays (2002) at 28. 
8 See Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1890) 4 Harvard Law Review 193 at 195. 
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interference, they should be equally capable to safeguard their private affairs, that is, their 
‘inviolate personality’, from being intruded against their will.9 This formulation of the right 
to privacy, stemming from a wide notion of the right to property, allows for the creation of a 
protective sphere that might extend to ‘personal appearance, sayings, acts, and to personal 
relation[s], domestic or otherwise’.10 It also has the added benefit of being applicable 
against the whole world, as opposed to related concepts such as breach of contract, trust or 
confidence which presuppose a more personal connection between the perpetrator and the 
victim.11 
     It is easy to realise from the above brief exposition of the right ‘to equal treatment’ and 
the right ‘to be let alone’ that the right to equality and the right to privacy share no common 
ground in terms of their origin; and the same applies, prima facie, with regard to their actual 
content. A requirement to respect rationality in the distribution of benefits or burdens is 
undeniably an important principle in any modern democracy –especially as it relates to the 
equal application of the laws- but it does not seem to interact in any direct way with the 
entitlement of individuals to seclude their personality. And yet, as already suggested, the 
right to equality and the right to privacy seem to share a common trait: they are both 
‘incomplete’ in the sense that their objective remains partly obscure. In other words, just as 
the right to equal treatment does not readily inform us what values are to be distributed 
equally, the right to be let alone does not offer any clear guidance as to what are those 
matters in relation to which one should be let alone.12    
 
B. Freedom of choice 
Efforts to explain the ‘what’ of equality and privacy have generated many different 
conceptions of the two notions. Thus, equality has been approached as enshrining a claim to 
(i) the equal protection of the laws (i.e. a responsibility to avoid arbitrary distinctions), (ii) 
redistribution (i.e. an obligation to address disadvantages commonly associated with 
specific statuses), (iii) recognition (i.e. a duty to create a sense of equal worth among 
various groups in the face of stigma, prejudice and other hostile attitudes), (iv) 
transformation (i.e. an expectation to change social structures so as to be make them more 
open to difference), and, (v) participation (i.e. a demand to increase the involvement of 
underrepresented groups in the political and social life).13 By the same token, we might 
refer to privacy as aiming to guarantee the individual exclusive control over his or her (i) 
personal information (e.g. right to secrecy of private conversations), (ii) private property 
(e.g. right to enjoy one’s home), (iii) physical space (e.g. right not to be subjected to stalking 
or arbitrary stop-and-search) and, (iv) freedom to make choices of a personal nature (e.g. 
what religion to follow).14  
     These formulations are not exhaustive, nor do they necessarily constitute a definitive 
statement of the content of either the right to equality or privacy. Nevertheless, they are 
indicative of the breadth of meanings that the two rights have been assigned. This serves to 
highlight an additional common element of equality and privacy; their multifaceted identity. 
Indeed, despite the fact that alternative suggestions as to the exact content of either right 
                                                          
9 Ibid. at 205.  
10 Ibid. at 211-213. 
11 Ibid. 
12 On the latter point, see Daniel J. Solove, Understanding Privacy (2008) at 17-18. 
13 See Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law, 2nd edn (2011) at 8-33. 
14 See Jon L. Mills, Privacy: The Lost Right (2008) at 13-20.  
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have been put forward, it is properly acknowledged that there exists a ‘diversity of 
equalities’15 and various 'types of privacy problems'.16 This is an important caveat to be 
taken into account in any analysis, as we need to be aware of the fact that we are actually 
dealing with a multiplicity of rights brought together under the ‘umbrella’ of equality or 
privacy; these rights remain distinct and need to be approached as such. Distinctiveness, 
however, does not necessarily preclude overlap. In fact, there is significant common ground 
within the different conceptions of equality and the same applies with regard to the various 
meanings of privacy.  
     For example -drawing from the formulations set out above- the effort to enhance equal 
participation in social life has much to gain from the transformation of adverse social 
structures; and the protection of private information might be jeopardised where an 
individual’s physical space is invaded. This overlap is not only internal within the multiple 
meanings of equality and privacy, but also extends to encompass other rights. For instance, 
the right to work could be affected where there is unequal pay for women and men; and the 
right to peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions may be engaged where the privacy of 
one’s private property is not respected. But there is also an additional dimension of overlap, 
one that concerns the very relationship between equality and privacy. In fact, it is fair to 
argue that, both in theory and in practice, freedom to make a choice is a shared element of 
the two fundamental rights. Let us illustrate this point with reference to the most common 
formulation of the right to equality; that is, the prohibition of discrimination.  
     When we assert that A must not discriminate against B on the grounds of sex, we may 
see ourselves as claiming that sex must not be taken into account in the context of 
distributing a particular benefit or burden, unless rationality dictates otherwise.17 However, 
we may also take a more substantive view according to which sex is a personal characteristic 
that should not affect the freedom of B to enjoy valuable options within the various spheres 
of public interaction and development, e.g. employment or education.18 For example, sex 
must not be used as grounds for limiting the options available to B in pursuing a specific job 
or a university degree. This focus on defending freedom of choice derives naturally from the 
notion of autonomous life which is also ‘bound up with the availability of valuable 
options’.19 Thus approached, equality aims to promote individual autonomy by 
                                                          
15 See Christopher McCrudden, ‘Thinking about the Discrimination Directives’ (2005) European Anti-
Discrimination Law Review, Issue No 1, 17 at 19. According to McCrudden, ‘[t]here are, essentially, four 
different (although overlapping) meanings currently attaching to the concept of equality as a policy goal: 
equality as individual justice, equality as group justice, equality as protecting and enhancing identity, and 
equality as participation’ (at 18).  
16 See Daniel J. Solove, supra n 12 at 172. Solove identifies (at 101-170) four groups of privacy problems and 
sixteen subgroups: ‘Information collection’ (which includes ‘surveillance’ and ‘interrogation’), ‘Information 
processing’ (which includes ‘aggregation’, ‘identification’, ‘insecurity’, ‘secondary use’ and ‘exclusion’), 
‘Information dissemination’ (which includes ‘breach of confidence’, ‘disclosure’, ‘exposure’, ‘increased 
accessibility’, ‘blackmail’, ‘appropriation’ and ‘distortion’) and ‘Invasion’ (which includes ‘intrusion’ and 
‘decisional interference’).   
17 For example, it is perfectly rational –albeit not necessary- that a director might choose to audition only 
women for the role of Alice in a production of Alice in Wonderland.     
18 For one of the most elaborate expositions of the freedom to make choices as the foundation of equality see 
Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined (1992).   
19 See Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (1986) at 395. Despite the connection drawn here between 
equality and autonomy, it is worth noting that Raz himself is one of the most prominent supporters of the view 
that equality is derivative in the sense that ‘[p]rinciples of equality always depend on other principles 
determining the value of the benefits which the egalitarian principles regulate’ (at 240).   
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guaranteeing that valuable options will remain open to all irrespective of immutable traits 
(e.g. sex and race) or fundamental choices (e.g. religion).20 It seems fair to argue then that 
‘[p]rohibitions on disparate treatment … insulate our deliberations from the cost of these 
traits: we can decide where to work or where to live without having to think about the low 
opinion others may have of our race or our gender’.21 Once we acknowledge this 
substantive dimension of equality, we start moving beyond notions of rationality in 
treatment, focusing instead on the broader aim of enabling the individual to function free 
from adverse social norms such as prejudice, stereotyping and lack of reasonable 
accommodation.22      
     It is not hard to imagine how this idea of insulating our deliberations from external 
interference also relates to the most basic manifestation of the right to privacy; that is, the 
right to control the dissemination of our personal information. Notions of seclusion, solitude 
and self-determination clearly play an important role in that context as well.23 And the point 
may reasonably be made that one of the key functions of informational privacy is to 
guarantee the autonomy to develop our ‘individuality and consciousness of individual 
choice’, to formulate our perceptions of the world without ‘fear of ridicule and penalty’.24 In 
that sense, the suggestion that we should be free to share information relating to our 
personal life as we decide is logically correlated to the assertion that we must also be able 
to shape our personal life as we see fit. For if external pressures determine important 
choices over our personal life, thereby shaping it, little autonomy over such a life is secured 
by the mere entitlement to keep its aspects secret. The right to make important choices 
over our personal lives free from external coercion arises then as an additional interest that 
needs to be safeguarded. The resulting decisional dimension of privacy overlaps 
conceptually with the substantive dimension of equality described above; that is, in so far as 
the limitation imposed upon individual freedom stems from prejudice, stereotyping or lack 
of reasonable accommodation of difference. 
     Ideals of recognition, participation and freedom of choice intertwine on this point of 
conceptual convergence between the right to equality and the right to privacy. We no 
longer talk only about equal treatment and freedom from arbitrariness, nor do we refer 
simply to the idea of being let alone and the proprietary interest over one’s personal affairs. 
Instead, the ability to lead an autonomous life, according to one’s own desires, is pushed 
forward. Each individual is to stand as an equal in making free (albeit not necessarily good) 
decisions affecting the course of his or her personal life, without having to face social 
oppression in the form of prejudice, stereotyping and lack reasonable accommodation. This 
link between decisional privacy and substantive equality is also acknowledged in the 
assertion that ‘the reasons why competent adults are entitled to privacy for their sexual and 
domestic affairs is not that choice is necessary to success in these –if, indeed, it is- but that 
it is necessary for us to see and treat each other as equals, rather than as masters and serfs, 
or as tools lacking ends of their own’.25  
                                                          
20 For a similar argument, see John Gardner, ‘On the Ground of Her Sex(uality)’ (1998) 18 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 167 at 170-171.  
21 See Sophia Moreau, ‘What is Discrimination?’ (2010) 38 Philosophy & Public Affairs at 143 at 155. 
22 See Charilaos Nikolaidis, The Right to Equality in European Human Rights Law: The Quest for Substance in the 
Jurisprudence of the European Courts (2015) at 14-28. 
23 See David H. Holtzman, Privacy lost: How Technology is Endangering Your Privacy (2006) at 4. 
24 See Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967) at 34. 
25 See Annabelle Lever, On Privacy (2012) at 63. 
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     At a more practical level, this relationship between equality and privacy on the basis of 
freedom of choice is evidenced by looking into the usual non-discrimination grounds which 
–as already noted above- may fairly be categorised as consisting of either immutable traits 
(e.g. sex or race) or fundamental choices (e.g. religion). In determining whether or not a 
choice is of fundamental character, it is only logical that we should take into account its 
impact. That impact may be assessed with reference to the significance of the choice in the 
protection of a fundamental right but also, more generally, with regard to the effect of the 
choice on one’s private life, understood broadly as the sphere within which the individual 
should enjoy absolute freedom from unwarranted external interferences.26 This is but one 
example of how privacy may not interact with equality only conceptually; instead, the 
decisional dimension of the former right might actually come to inform the application of 
the substantive dimension of the latter.27 
     With a view to demonstrating the relevance of the above mentioned observations at a 
more practical level, the next part of this essay will examine how the interaction between 
decisional privacy and substantive equality has been evidenced in the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Supreme Court of the United States 
(SCOTUS). The two Courts are being chosen due to their special prominence as actors for 
the development of human rights norms at the federal (United States of America) and 
international (European) levels but also as providing, within their jurisprudence, good 
examples of how the link between equality and privacy becomes relevant in practice. The 
focus will be primarily –albeit not exclusively- on the issue of legal treatment of same sex 
relationships, intimate association being considered an area where choice as to how 
individuals will lead their personal lives becomes highly prominent. Having gone through the 
doctrinal side of the argument, the final section will assess the normative implications of the 
interaction between equality and privacy in the case-law of the two courts. 
 
3. EQUALITY AND PRIVACY IN ADJUDICATION 
 
A. Introducing the two Courts 
The ECtHR is an international institution which has been described –not indisputably- as 
exercising a semi-constitutional function in the sense that it sets standards for sovereign 
States in Europe to follow by interpreting, mainly in the context of cases brought before it, 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).28 The SCOTUS is a domestic institution 
empowered to pass judgment on issues arising under the Constitution of the United States 
of America and under the laws of the Federal Structure, its leading role in constitutional 
adjudication having been the subject of heated debate since the early days of its existence.29 
                                                          
26 For an argument along the same lines see Robert Wintemute, Sexual Orientation and Human Rights: The 
United States Constitution, the European Convention and the Canadian Charter (1995) at 16. 
27 The formal dimension of equality is not engaged here because it is taken to concern any ground, not 
necessarily one that refers to immutable traits or fundamental choices, given that –as previously explained- 
the goal is simply to prevent arbitrary distinctions stemming from reliance on irrelevant factors. 
28 See Articles 19 and 32 of the European Convention on Human Rights. For a good discussion of the 
controversy surrounding the ‘constitutional’ character of the ECtHR see Robert Harmsen, 'The European Court 
of Human Rights as a ''Constitutional Court'': Definitional Debates and the Dynamics of Reform' in John 
Morison, Kieran McEvoy, and Gordon Anthony (eds), Judges, Transition, and Human Rights (2007) at 33-53. 
29 See Article III of the Constitution of the United States of America. For a classic instance of the debate 
surrounding the role of the SCOTUS in the US Constitutional order, see Alexander M. Bickel, The Least 
Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics, 2nd edn (1986).  
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The judgments of both courts are capable of affecting public policy across States that share 
many differences despite being part of the same international or federal order.30 But the 
manner through which this may occur is hardly similar. The SCOTUS can bring about 
systemic change within the various States of the United States of America by striking down 
State and federal laws that conflict with the US Constitution while the ECtHR can only put 
pressure on sovereign States to change their laws through the finding of a violation of the 
European Convention.31  
     The dissimilarities between the two courts range beyond their respective international 
and domestic character, the enforceability and effect of their judgments, or even the fact 
that the ECtHR is a specialised human rights court while the SCOTUS exercises jurisdiction 
upon a wider range of constitutional and federal issues.32 And yet the criticism has been 
advanced that in pursuing its aspirations to set uniform human rights standards throughout 
the Member States, the ECtHR ‘considers itself the equivalent of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, laying down a federal law of Europe’.33 This assertion is useful in 
demonstrating that both courts have come to be seen as yielding a power which resembles 
that of the law maker as much as that of the judge.34 This is perhaps not surprising if we 
consider that they are called upon to interpret human rights with primary reference to a 
document which does not contain detailed guidance as to the content of such rights, is not 
easily amendable and has been drafted at a time distant to the modern experience.35 The 
line demarcating the limits of judicial discretion may become particularly blurry in this 
                                                          
30 The judgments of SCOTUS are considered authoritative even beyond the context of the litigation that led to 
them, although the politicisation of constitutional adjudication may often place that authoritativeness in 
question: see Michel Rosenfeld, ‘Constitutional Adjudication in Europe and the United States: Paradoxes and 
Contrasts’, (2004) 2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 633. The judgments of the ECtHR are only 
binding between the parties to the dispute, technically, but practically they are addressed to the whole 
regional legal order insofar as they set the expectations for human rights protection within it: see Laurence R. 
Helfer and Eric Voeten, ‘International Courts as Agents of Legal Change: Evidence from LGBT Rights in Europe’ 
(2014) 68 International Organization 77.      
31 The SCOTUS asserted that power itself, in the seminal case of Marbury v Madison 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
Repealing a piece of domestic legislation as a consequence of an ECtHR judgment is, quite expectedly, a lot 
more challenging even as concerns the State party against which the violation has been established; not to 
mention the other Member States. This much is hinted by the terms of Article 46 ECHR and illustrated by lines 
of cases such as the one of Hirst v United Kingdom (No 2) Application No 74025/01, Merits and Just 
Satisfaction, 6 October 2005; Greens and M.T. v United Kingdom Applications Nos 60041/08 and 60054/08, 
Merits and Just Satisfaction, 23 November 2010; Firth and Others v United Kingdom Applications Nos 47784/09 
et al., Merits and Just Satisfaction, 12 August 2014; McHugh and Others v United Kingdom Applications Nos 
51987/08 et al., Merits and Just Satisfaction, 10 February 2015 and Millbank and Others v United Kingdom 
Applications Nos 44473/14 et al., Merits and Just Satisfaction, 30 June 2016. 
32 For example, an inquiry into the processes of appointment of their members, the drafting of their 
judgments, the preferred methods of interpretation and even the annual workload of each court can also be 
quite informative in making sense of their respective roles, powers and limitations. But that would be outside 
the scope of this paper. 
33 See Lord Hoffmann, ‘The Universality of Human Rights’, Judicial Studies Board Annual Lecture, 19 March 
2009, p. 14, available at: https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/Hoffmann_2009_JSB_Annual_Lecture_Universality_of_Human_Rights.pdf [Last 
accessed 19 September 2018]. 
34 To use the words of one of the most vocal critics of such a mentality prevailing within the SCOTUS, ‘it is one 
of the unhappy incidents of the federal system that a self-righteous Supreme Court, acting on its Members’ 
personal view …, can impose   its   own   favored   social   and   economic   dispositions nationwide’ (Dissenting 
opinion of Justice Scalia in United States v Virginia 518 U. S. 515 (1996) at 601). 
35 The US Constitution was signed in 1787 and the Bill of Rights (the first ten amendments to the Constitution) 
was adopted four years later. The European Convention was signed in 1950.  
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context, the two courts having to tackle hard questions with reference to a static document 
but within a platform of varying political, social and even moral dynamics.36  
     The mere act of reviewing the relationship between equality and privacy within their 
jurisprudence amounts to an indirect acknowledgment of the two courts’ active role in 
developing –not only interpreting- human rights standards. A simple look into the text of the 
European Convention and the US constitution reveals why this is the case. The European 
Convention only prohibits discrimination in relation to the enjoyment of the rights 
enshrined therein, the prohibition contained in Article 14 ECHR having been described as 
‘parasitic’ and ‘subordinate’ to the other Convention rights as a result.37 And the US 
Constitution makes no express reference to privacy or respect for private life as a distinct 
right. On the face of it then, any meaningful interaction between the right to equality and 
the right to privacy seems difficult when we peruse the European Convention and practically 
impossible when we study the US Constitution. And yet, such a relationship is anything but 
illusionary if we shift our attention to the jurisprudence of the SCOTUS and the ECtHR.   
 
B. Privacy, private life and equality 
In the case of Griswold v Connecticut,38 Justice Douglas, delivering the opinion of the 
SCOTUS, famously claimed that the ‘penumbra’ of various guarantees in the Bill of rights 
created ‘zones of privacy’.39 For example, he referred to the case of NAACP v Alabama,40 
where the Court emphasised that ‘privacy in one’s association’ was ‘indispensable to 
preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident 
beliefs’.41 Thus, the ‘penumbra’ of the First Amendment established a zone of privacy, 
freedom of association being a ‘peripheral First Amendment right’.42 By the same token, the 
guarantees put forward in the Fourth43 and Fifth44 Amendments created zones of privacy, 
being concerned with ‘the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life’.45 The same 
was true of the Third Amendment46 which also generated a zone of privacy.47 Accordingly, 
even though the right to (marital, in the case of Griswold) privacy was nowhere to be found 
in the text of the Bill of Rights, the ‘penumbras’ theory, also supported by the Ninth 
Amendment,48 enabled the SCOTUS to bring it into being.49 In turn, the Fourteenth 
                                                          
36 See, for example, Paul Mahoney, ‘Judicial Activism and Judicial Self-Restraint in the European Court of 
Human Rights: Two Sides of the Same Coin’ (1990) 11 Human Rights Law Journal 57; also see Archibald Cox, 
‘The New Dimensions of Constitutional Adjudication’ (1975-1976) 51 Washington Law Review 791.  
37 See, for example, Janneke Gerards, ‘The Discrimination Grounds of Article 14 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights’ (2013) 13 Human Rights Law Review 99 at 100. 
38 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
39 Ibid. at 484. 
40 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
41 Ibid. at 462 (per Justice Harlan); also see Griswold, supra n 38 at 483. 
42 See Griswold, supra n 38 at 483-484. 
43 ‘The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated …’. 
44 ‘No Person … shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself …’. 
45 See Boyd v United States 116 U.S. 616 (1886) at 630; referred to by Justice Douglas in Griswold, supra n 38 at 
484. 
46 ‘No Soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in any house without the consent of the Owner …’. 
47 See Griswold, supra n 38 at 484. 
48 ‘The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others 
retained by the people’. The significance of the Ninth Amendments was mentioned by Justice Douglas and was 
further elaborated upon by Justice Goldberg in his concurring opinion, joined by Chief Justice Warren and 
Justice Brennan: see Griswold, supra n 38 at 484 and 486-499. 
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Amendment allowed protection of the said right to be extended to state law.50 The result of 
Griswold was that married couples should be allowed to choose whether or not to use 
means of contraception and, as a result, States should not punish those who made use of 
them or those who facilitated access to them. Seven years later, during the course of 
delivering the opinion of the SCOTUS in Eisenstadt v Baird,51 Justice Brennan described 
privacy as entailing ‘the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as 
the decision whether to bear or beget a child’.52  
     Only one year after Eisenstadt and eight years after Griswold, in the seminal case of Roe v 
Wade,53 this right to privacy was further extended by the SCOTUS to guarantee a woman’s 
right to decide freely whether or not to have an abortion. But this time privacy was not 
approached as emanating from the ‘penumbra’ of other constitutional rights and simply 
given effect –against the actions of a state- through the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment; instead, it was seen as being part of the ‘concept of personal 
liberty’54 contained therein. That concept of personal liberty had been relied upon even 
before Griswold in the course of securing individuals the right to be free from government 
intrusion in exercising choice about important aspects of private life, such as the mode of 
education of their children.55 It  
 
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right of the 
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to 
acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to 
worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to 
enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly 
pursuit of happiness by free men.56  
 
It seems to be the case then that privacy was never understood by the SCOTUS only as 
pursuing an entitlement to spatial or informational seclusion. Instead, it has always had a 
decisional dimension as well, one that stems from the right to individual autonomy.57  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
49 It is worth mentioning that the ‘penumbras’ approach has been heavily criticised -as has been the invocation 
of the right to privacy- even by scholars who agree with the end result of the case: see, for example, Martha C. 
Nussbaum, From Disgust to Humanity: Sexual Orientation & Constitutional Law (2010) at 68-77.    
50 ‘… No State shall … deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law …’. 
51 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
52 Ibid. at 453. 
53 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
54 Ibid. at 153. It is worth noting that this approach echoes the concurring opinions of Justice White and Justice 
Harlan in Griswold, supra 38. 
55 Thus, for example, in Meyer v Nebraska 262 U.S. 390 (1923) the SCOTUS declared unconstitutional a State 
law which dictated that children are not to be taught any modern language other than English before 
completing the eighth grade, as this interfered in an arbitrary manner with the liberty of the parents to have 
their children instructed as they see fit and the liberty of the foreign language instructors to teach (at 400 and 
403). By the same token, in Pierce v Society of Sisters 268 U.S. 510 (1925) the SCOTUS found that a law which 
obliged children to attend exclusively public schools between the ages of eight and sixteen amounted to an 
undue interference with the liberty of the parents to direct their children’s education (at 534-535). 
56 See Meyer, ibid. at 399.  
57 For a discussion of this dimension of the right to privacy in the United States, see Jeffrey M. Shaman, 
Equality and Liberty in the Golden Age of State Constitutional Law (2008) at 121-162.  
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     The right to privacy, as construed by the SCOTUS, has been as much concerned with 
keeping personal matters away from the public eye, as it has been with ‘the interest in 
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions’.58 This extrovert conception of 
privacy is not particularly hard to align with the definition given to ‘private life’ by the ECtHR 
in interpreting Article 8 ECHR.59 In the early days of the European Convention, the European 
Commission on Human Rights construed the notion of ‘private life’ as being wider than the 
notion of ‘privacy’. According to the Commission, the former notion also referred to the 
ability of the individual to form relations with others and to develop and fulfil their 
personality, while the latter notion was limited to guaranteeing protection from 
unwarranted publicity.60 Such a distinction appears no longer valid (if it ever was), at least 
not if we refer to the jurisprudence of the SCOTUS. In fact, quite the opposite seems to be 
the case. The notions of privacy and private life, as explicated by the SCOTUS and the ECtHR 
respectively, can be characterised as largely equivalent in terms of their wider meaning. 
     According to the ECtHR, the notion of private life, which is not open to an exhaustive 
definition, refers to ‘an "inner circle" in which the individual may live his own personal life as 
he chooses and to exclude therefrom entirely the outside world not encompassed within 
that circle’.61 But this is far from the end of the matter. The need to respect private life ‘also 
comprise[s] to a certain degree the right to establish and develop relationships with other 
human beings’.62 Private life ‘includes a person's physical and psychological integrity and can 
sometimes embrace aspects of an individual's physical and social identity’.63 The right to 
respect for private life also incorporates ‘a right to identity and personal development’64 and 
aspects ‘such as gender identification, name, sexual orientation and sexual life are 
important elements of the personal sphere protected by Article 8’.65 The ECtHR has also 
established that ‘the notion of personal autonomy is an important principle underlying the 
interpretation [of Article 8]’.66 It emerges that respect for private life, as interpreted by the 
ECtHR, is not confined to guaranteeing spatial or informational security either, but it also 
has a decisional dimension, entitling individuals to live a life of their own choosing within 
their personal sphere.67  
     Just as this autonomy based, decisional, aspect of the right to respect for private life in 
the European Convention may be seen as aiming to secure ‘freedom of action and life-
                                                          
58 See Whalen v Roe 429 U.S. 589 (1977) at 599-600. For an elaborate study of the distinction between 
‘proprietary’ and ‘decisional’ privacy in the US, see Mary McThomas, The Dual System of Privacy Rights in the 
United States (2014).  
59 Article 8(1) ECHR stipulates that ‘[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence’. 
60 See X v Iceland Application No 6825/74, Commission Decision, 18 May 1976.  
61 See Niemietz v Germany Application No 13710/88, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 16 December 1992 at para 
29. 
62 Ibid. 
63 See Mikulić v Croatia Application No 53176/99, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 7 February 2002 at para 53. 
64 See Peck v United Kingdom Application No 44647/98, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 28 January 2003 at para 
57. 
65 Ibid. 
66 See Pretty v United Kingdom Application No 2346/02, Merits, 29 April 2002 at para 61. 
67 For an interesting exposition of the different private life interests involved in the interpretation of Article 8 
by the ECtHR, including the one of personal autonomy, see N.A. Moreham, ‘The Right to Respect for Private 
Life in the European Convention on Human Rights: A Re-examination’ (2008) European Human Rights Law 
Review, Issue No 1, 44; for a broader discussion of how a right to personal autonomy might be said to emerge 
from Article 8, see Jill Marshall, ‘A Right to Personal Autonomy at the European Court of Human Rights’ (2008) 
European Human Rights Law Review, Issue No 3, 337. 
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style’,68 the decisional facet of the right to privacy in the US Constitution has been 
eloquently described as being based on the need to secure ‘an area, free from public 
scrutiny, in which an individual can develop her own views and enact her chosen lifestyle’.69 
Defining the limits of that area, that is, identifying the point where the interests of the 
individual will need to give way to the interests of society as a whole, is to define the limits 
of the decisional dimension of the right to privacy.70 This is where the substantive dimension 
of equality becomes most relevant in the case-law of the two courts, reminding us that 
attitudes stemming from social oppression in the form of prejudice, stereotyping and lack of 
reasonable accommodation of difference, should never be perceived as a societal interest 
strong enough to trump the right of the individual to choose how to lead his or her life. And 
this is the point where equality and privacy interact so strongly that they appear to become 
essentially the same right. The way the two courts have dealt with the issue of 
decriminalising same-sex relationships provides an excellent illustration of this observation. 
 
C. Tracing the link between substantive equality and decisional privacy 
In Dudgeon v United Kingdom71 the ECtHR was faced with the criminalisation of certain 
forms of sexual contact between consenting male adults in Northern Ireland. The matter at 
hand was approached in the judgment as affecting ‘a most intimate aspect of private life’.72 
This view played a pivotal role in limiting the margin of appreciation granted to the national 
authorities, thereby enabling the European Court to conclude that 
 
there [was] now a better understanding, and in consequence an increased 
tolerance, of homosexual behaviour to the extent that in the great majority of the 
member States of the Council of Europe it [was] no longer considered to be 
necessary or appropriate to treat homosexual practices of the kind now in question 
as in themselves a matter to which the sanctions of the criminal law should be 
applied.73  
 
The European Court further noticed that even ‘[i]n Northern Ireland itself, the authorities 
have refrained in recent years from enforcing the law in respect of private homosexual acts 
between consenting males over the age of 21 years capable of valid consent’.74 The 
defending government claimed that the interference at hand was justified mainly because 
of the adverse ‘moral climate in Northern Ireland’ towards homosexuality and the need ‘to 
preserve prevailing moral standards’.75 This aim was deemed to be legitimate, but 
criminalisation of certain forms of sexual contact between consenting male adults could not 
be considered a proportionate way to pursue it.76 Accordingly, there was a violation of the 
right to respect for the applicant’s private life, enshrined in Article 8 ECHR. 
                                                          
68 See David Feldman, ‘The developing scope of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (1997) 
European Human Rights Law Review, Issue No 3, 265 at 267. 
69 See Mary McThomas, supra n 58 at 25. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Application No 7525/76, Merits, 22 October 1981. 
72 Ibid. at para 52. 
73 Ibid. at para 60. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. at para 57. 
76 Ibid. at paras 57 and 60. 
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     That landmark decision of the ECtHR was expressly taken into account by the SCOTUS 
when it overruled its previous case-law in 2003. Indeed, the majority of the US Court had 
established back in 1986, in the case of Bowers v Hardwick,77 that there was nothing in the 
US Constitution to prevent the criminalization of consensual sodomy. According to the 
SCOTUS, the right to engage privately in homosexual sodomy was neither ‘implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty’ nor ‘deeply rooted in th[e] Nation’s history and tradition’ and, as 
a result, it did not fall within the substantive due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the US Constitution.78 In fact, Chief Justice Burger observed in his concurring 
opinion that to recognise such a fundamental right under the due process clause ‘would be 
to cast aside millennia of moral teaching’.79 It was not until 17 years later, in Lawrence v 
Texas,80 that the majority of the SCOTUS recognised an ‘emerging awareness that liberty 
gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in 
matters pertaining to sex’.81 In reaching this conclusion, the US Court relied, inter alia, on 
the judgment of the European Court in Dudgeon, finding the decision to be ‘at odds with the 
premise in Bowers that the claim put forward was insubstantial in our Western 
civilization’.82 Like the ECtHR, the SCOTUS embarked on an examination of State practice, 
noting that of the 25 States that had been referenced in its earlier jurisprudence as having 
sodomy laws in place, only 13 retained them when Lawrence came to be decided, only four 
of these actually enforcing them.83 
     An interesting element in both Dudgeon and Lawrence is the emphasis placed on the 
personal liberty of the people potentially affected by the impugned pieces of legislation.84 
This becomes even more apparent in the latter judgment. In contrast to Lawrence where 
the petitioners had actually been arrested and convicted of deviate sexual intercourse, the 
applicant in Dudgeon was never charged with an offence; he actually complained of the 
‘fear, suffering and psychological distress directly caused by the very existence of the laws in 
                                                          
77 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
78 Ibid., at 192-193. The former quote is drawn from the judgment of the SCOTUS in Palko v Connecticut 302 
U.S. 319 (1937) at 325-326 and the latter from the judgment of the same Court in Moore v East Cleveland 431 
U.S. 494 (1977) at 503. 
79 See Bowers v Hardwick, supra n 77 at 198. 
80 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
81 Ibid. at 572. The importance of Lawrence radiates beyond same-sex relations, especially when placed within 
the broader discussion concerning the interaction between gender and privacy: see, for example, Jeannie Suk, 
‘Is Privacy a Woman?’ (2009) 97 The Georgetown Law Journal 485 at 509-513.  
82 Lawrence, supra n 80 at 573. The judgments of the ECtHR in Modinos v Cyprus Application No 15070/89, 
Merits and Just Satisfaction, 22 April 1993 and Norris v Ireland, Application No 10581/83, Merits and Just 
Satisfaction, 26 October 1988, which effectively confirmed the finding in Dudgeon, were also expressly relied 
upon by the US Court (ibid. at 576). Reliance on decisions of foreign legal materials in interpreting the US 
Constitution is not without its critics; see, for example, the dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia in Lawrence, 
supra at 598; also see Antonin Scalia, ‘Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts’ (2004) 98 Proceedings of 
the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 305 and Robert J. Delahunty and John Yoo, 
‘Against Foreign Law’ (2005) 29 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 291. 
83 See Lawrence, supra n 80 at 572-573. 
84 From a doctrinal point of view, such an emphasis may well be seen as the corollary of the restrictiveness of 
the non-discrimination clause contained in Article 14 ECHR and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment; and the need of the courts to stray away from these provisions in affording more effective 
protection. For a brief discussion of the limitations of Article 14 ECHR, see Charilaos Nikolaidis, supra n 22 at 
53-57; for a similar discussion with reference to the equal protection guarantee contained in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, see Kenji Yoshino, ‘The New Equal Protection’ (2011) 124 Harvard Law Review 747 at 755-776. 
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question - including fear of harassment and blackmail’.85 This was enough, according to the 
ECtHR, to constitute an interference with -and eventually a breach of- Mr Dudgeon’s right to 
respect for his private life.86 Such a right to personal autonomy was understood as entailing 
respect for a person’s ‘most private human conduct’87 and ‘private life’.88 The element of 
choice as a manifestation of an individual’s liberty in his or her private sphere was the key to 
tackling the issue before both Courts. Indeed, the criminalisation of homosexual intimacy 
obliged Mr Dudgeon to ‘refrai[n] from engaging – even in private with consenting male 
partners - in prohibited sexual acts to which he is disposed by reason of his homosexual 
tendencies’.89 By the same token,  it hampered Mr Lawrence’s liberty ‘to choose without 
being punished’90 by failing ‘to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this 
relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their 
dignity as free persons’.91   
     Both Dudgeon and Lawrence could have easily been decided under the non-
discrimination clause contained in Article 14 ECHR or the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment respectively.92 In fact, as Justice Blackmun eloquently noticed in his 
dissenting opinion in Bowers, ‘a necessary corollary of giving individuals freedom to choose 
how to conduct their lives is acceptance of the fact that different individuals will make 
different choices’.93 Following this line of thought, respecting difference may often be seen 
as lying at the heart of the liberty we address when are dealing with the protection of 
privacy or private life. Both Mr Dudgeon and Mr Lawrence where effectively subjected to 
penalties and stigmatisation for expressing their sexuality in circumstances where 
heterosexual individuals would be free to do as they please. It was exclusively because of 
their sexual orientation that their liberty to make a choice as regards their intimate 
associations was impinged upon. In fact, the resulting impact on their private life could be 
                                                          
85 See Dudgeon, supra n 71 at para 37. 
86 It is worth noting that Judges Matscher, Pinheiro Farinha and Walsh disagreed and claimed in their 
dissenting opinions that the applicant was not actually a ‘victim’ (see Article 34 ECHR) of a violation. 
87 See Lawrence, supra n 80 at 567  
88 See Dudgeon, supra n 71 at para 41. 
89 Ibid. at para 41. 
90 See Lawrence, supra n 80 at 567. 
91 Ibid. 
92 A steadily evolving understanding of equality and liberty as values that are actually confluent and synergetic 
has not gone unnoticed, especially as regards the interpretation of the equal protection clause and the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by the SCOTUS; and a huge debate has emerged around the 
normative implications of this development, with notes of joy as well as caution: see, for example, Laurence H. 
Tribe, ‘Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name’ (2014) 117 Harvard Law 
1893 at 1898; Kenji Yoshino, supra n 84; Rebecca L. Brown, ‘Liberty, The New Equality’ (2002) 77 New York 
University Law Review 1491; Pamela S. Karlan, ‘Equal Protection, Due Process, and the Stereoscopic 
Fourteenth Amendment’ (2001-2002) 33 McGeorge Law Review 473; Richard A. Epstein, ‘Liberty, Equality, and 
Privacy: Choosing a Legal Foundation for Gay Rights’ (2002) 2002 University of Chicago Legal Forum 73; Cass R. 
Sunstein, ‘Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship between Due Process and Equal 
Protection’ (1988) 55 University of Chicago Law Review 1161; and Ira C. Lupu, ‘Untangling the Strands of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’ (1979) 77 Michigan Law Review 981.    
93 See Bowers, supra n 77 at 205-206 (Dissenting opinion of Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Brennan, 
Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens).   
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seen as an aggravating factor towards establishing the invidiousness of the distinction at 
hand.94  
     To illustrate this point, it is useful to draw a parallel with other seminal cases and test 
whether or not the same link between privacy and equality can be traced even beyond the 
issue of same sex relationships. An interesting example would be the previously mentioned 
case of Roe, where the SCOTUS decided that the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment secured a right to have an abortion, subject to certain conditions. That case 
could have also been decided under the rubric of equality on the simple biological fact that 
pregnancies take place within a woman’s body as opposed to a man’s and, as a result, 
prohibiting their termination necessarily affected the former more than the latter. Still, this 
would not be the end of the equality analysis. As in Lawrence, the issue would have to be 
addressed whether or not that distinction was justifiable. It would be at this point where the 
equality analysis could merge with the one based on privacy. For the interest protected by 
the right to substantive equality, that is, freedom from social oppression in the form of 
prejudice, stereotyping and lack of reasonable accommodation, seems to coincide with the 
interest protected by what Justice Blackmun described in his dissenting opinion in Bowers as 
the decisional aspect of the right to privacy, that is, the recognition that there are ‘certain 
decisions that are properly for the individual to make’.95  
     The rationale behind this coincidence is that the adverse social dynamics which violate 
the right to equality will very often impinge on the ability of the individual to make 
important choices about his or her life. Conversely, interferences with private choice may 
leave people exposed to adverse social dynamics or they might even help perpetuate such 
dynamics. For example, a homosexual couple that is not allowed to engage in certain sexual 
acts is denied enjoyment of a most intimate aspect of their private life but, at the same 
time, is marginalised as immoral or perverted in the eyes of society, thus confirming and 
reinforcing any prejudice and stereotyping that underpinned the initial prohibition. By the 
same token, allowing a choice as to whether or not to have an abortion might help 
recognise and accommodate the specific situation women might find themselves in by 
offering a shield against the possible consequences of an unwanted pregnancy, both at a 
personal and a social level (e.g. prejudice and stereotyping against single mothers). Thus 
construed, the notion of equal liberty in shaping one’s destiny by exercising freedom of 
choice is the link between the right to (substantive) equality and the right to (decisional) 
privacy.  
     This intersection can be eloquently articulated in terms of what has been described as 
the pursuit of ‘equal citizenship’, that is, the need to secure to every individual ‘the dignity 
of full membership in the society’ as a matter of law and fact.96 Taking away the right to free 
choice about important aspects of one’s private life by virtue of a personal characteristic 
opens the gates for stigmatisation and marginalisation which deny equal participation and 
the ‘right to be treated as a person, one of equal worth among citizens’.97 This much 
becomes evident from the further example of the case of Mr Duncan Lustig-Prean and Mr 
                                                          
94 For a similar argument and for a wider discussion of how Justice Blackmun’s legacy reinforced an integrated 
understanding of privacy, liberty and equality, see Pamela S. Karlan, ‘Some Thoughts on Autonomy and 
Equality in Relation to Justice Blackmun’ (1998-1999) 26 Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 59. 
95 See Bowers, supra n 77 at 204. 
96 See Kenneth L. Karst, ‘Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment’ (1977) 91 Harvard 
Law Review 1 at 5. 
97 Ibid. at 32. 
15 
 
John Beckett, brought before the ECtHR.98 The two applicants were subjected to an 
investigation as to their sexual orientation and were subsequently discharged from the 
Royal Navy because the British Ministry of Defence had a policy of excluding homosexuals 
from the armed forces. The ECtHR accepted that the policy related to national security and 
‘the operational effectiveness of the armed forces’, an area where a margin of appreciation 
is normally accorded to the States;99 but it also noticed that the investigation into their 
sexual orientation and the subsequent discharge impinged upon ‘a most intimate aspect of 
an individual’s private life’.100 Eventually, it found a violation of Article 8 ECHR, considering it 
unnecessary to look into the Article 14 ECHR claim.  
     The core argument of the defending government was that homosexuality posed a threat 
to the effectiveness of the armed forces due to ‘the negative attitudes of heterosexual 
personnel towards those of homosexual orientation’.101 The ECtHR replied that  
 
[t]o the extent that they represent a predisposed bias on the part of a heterosexual 
majority against a homosexual minority, these negative attitudes cannot, of 
themselves, be considered … to amount to sufficient justification for the 
interferences with the applicants’ rights … .102  
 
It is quite remarkable how the dialectics of prejudice and stereotyping directed against a 
certain group of people imbued an analysis which centred around the right to respect for 
the applicants’ private life, not their right to equality and non-discrimination. From a 
normative standpoint, this conflation can be explained if we accept that the decisional 
dimension of the privacy claim at hand was actually conflated with the equality dimension 
of the case. The freedom of Mr Lustig-Prean and Mr Beckett to develop themselves and 
their lives as they saw fit, free from external oppression in the form of social bias, had 
already been dealt with in the course of analysing Article 8 ECHR.  
     In fact, as in Dudgeon, the ECtHR itself conceded that the claim under Article 8 taken in 
conjunction with Article 14 ECHR was practically ‘the same complaint, albeit seen from a 
different angle [and did] not give rise to any separate issue’.103 But even though this 
conflation of the privacy and equality claims was recognised as a conclusion, the actual way 
in which it occurred was not mapped out, just as it was not explained in Dudgeon. By 
emphasising the ‘exceptionally intrusive character’104 of the investigation that took place, 
the ECtHR seemed to highlight the informational, introvert dimension of the applicants’ 
right to privacy; that is, their entitlement to keep their sexual orientation to themselves, 
away from the public eye.105 At the same time, however, the European Court also declared 
                                                          
98 See Lustig-Prean and Beckett v United Kingdom Applications Nos 31417/96 and 32377/96, Merits, 27 
September 1999; also see Smith and Grady v United Kingdom Applications Nos 33985/96 and 33986/96, 
Merits, 27 September 1999. 
99 Ibid. at para 82. 
100 Ibid. at para 83. 
101 Ibid. at paras 88-89. 
102 Ibid. at para 90. 
103 Ibid. at paras 108-109; also see Dudgeon, supra n 71 at para 69. 
104 Lustig-Prean and Beckett, supra n 98 at para 84. 
105 For a wider critique of how the ECtHR has defended homosexuality as protectable primarily in the private as 
opposed to the public sphere, see Paul Johnson, ‘An Essentially Private Manifestation of Human Personality: 
Constructions of Homosexuality in the European Court of Human Rights’, Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 10, 
Issue 1, 2010, pp. 67-97. 
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that social bias should never be allowed to act as basis for excluding homosexuals from the 
army and that the discharge of the applicants had ‘a profound effect on their careers and 
prospects’.106 In doing so, the ECtHR emphasised the decisional, extrovert dimension of 
privacy, which demands equal respect for all to participate in society and to make important 
choices about their personal development without fear of being marginalised.107  
     Even though this latter conception of privacy is in line with the right to equality, it 
remains the case that, as previously mentioned, there seems to be no conceptual clarity as 
to the way in which the said interaction takes place. Having identified a link between privacy 
and equality in theory and in the case law of the two courts, the logical next step must be to 
articulate that link in a clear manner. The assertion that we have two rights protecting the 
exact same interest -that is, the interest in making important choices about one’s personal 
development free from social oppression- might reasonably be seen as conceptually 
confusing; and yet, as it will be argued in the next section, there is a good explanation as to 
why this happened and a single notion that can help us unravel the knot created by equality 
and privacy in an orderly fashion.  
 
4. EQUALITY, PRIVACY AND THE LOST TERM THAT BRINGS THEM TOGETHER 
 
A. A right in search of a name 
In Christine Goodwin v United Kingdom,108 the ECtHR was faced with the failure of the 
defending State to provide legal recognition of the change of sex of the applicant, who was 
registered male at birth but had undergone gender reassignment surgery. In establishing a 
violation of the right to respect for private life, the ECtHR emphasised the particularly 
important role that the notion of personal autonomy plays in the interpretation of Article 8 
and noted that protecting an individual’s private sphere includes the right to establish 
details of one’s identity.109 It then moved on to find that the placement of people like the 
applicant in an ‘intermediate zone as not quite one gender or the other’ impinged upon ‘the 
right of transsexuals to personal development and to physical and moral security in the full 
sense enjoyed by others in society’.110 The ECtHR also observed the failure of the United 
Kingdom to tackle this problem ‘despite an increase in the social acceptance of the 
phenomenon of transsexualism and a growing recognition of the problems with which 
transsexuals are confronted’.111 Once again, the ECtHR concluded that ‘no separate issue’ 
arose under Article 14 ECHR, the ‘discriminatory experiences and prejudices’ the applicant 
claimed to have experienced due to the lack of recognition having already been addressed 
in the course of finding a violation of Article 8 ECHR. The reasoning of the ECtHR in that case 
constitutes a further excellent illustration of the link between privacy and equality. The key 
                                                          
106 See Lustig-Prean and Beckett, supra n 98 at para 85. 
107 For an interesting discussion on how the case could have been decided to bring forward the different 
dimensions of privacy as well as the equality issue at hand, see Michael Kavey, ‘The Public Faces of Privacy: 
Rewriting Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. United Kingdom’ in Eva Brems (ed), Diversity and European Human 
Rights: Rewriting Judgments of the ECHR (2013) 293. 
108 Application No 28957/95, Merits and Just Satisfaction, Judgment of 11 July 2002. 
109 Ibid. at para 90. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid. at para 92. The ECtHR referred to similar cases brought before it in the past, where it had refused to 
find a violation but it had urged the United Kingdom to keep its policy under review, having regard to scientific 
and social developments in that area: see, for example, Sheffield and Horsham v United Kingdom Applications 
Nos 22985/93 and 23390/94, Merits, 30 July 1998 at para 60.   
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through which such a link was achieved in that particular case was the abovementioned 
requirement to safeguard the moral security of the individual on an equal footing with 
others.  
     In fact, the notion of moral security seems to encapsulate most eloquently the need for 
recognition in the eyes of the State and in the eyes of society alike; for to guarantee moral 
security is to make sure that ‘our moral standing and basic needs are recognised by others 
as limiting what may legitimately be done to us, and that our interests and welfare will be 
regarded as morally important by social, political, and legal institutions’.112 Discriminatory 
attitudes directed against certain groups are bound to negate such recognition of the equal 
moral value of every individual’s interests and welfare.113 Mrs Goodwin, the applicant who 
had undergone gender reassignment, was denied recognition of her sex essentially due to 
lack of reasonable accommodation stemming from the failure of the United Kingdom to 
make an exception to the historical nature of the birth register system.114 As a consequence, 
her freedom to proceed with her life as she wished was impinged upon, the applicant being 
left exposed to ‘stress’, ‘alienation’, ‘embarrassment’, ‘vulnerability’, ‘humiliation’, ‘anxiety’ 
or other practical difficulties (e.g. different pension rights).115 Thus, jeopardizing her right to 
be free from social oppression in the form of prejudice, stereotyping and lack of reasonable 
accommodation (substantive equality), directly compromised her right to make important 
choices about her personal development in an autonomous manner (decisional privacy).  
     The notion of moral security, then, is yet another way to describe the interrelationship 
between privacy and equality, as is ‘equal citizenship’ and other notions such as ‘personal 
liberty’, ‘recognition’ or ‘personal development’. But in order to fully grasp the human 
interest at hand and to develop the basic tenets of the correlative right it gives rise to, it is 
important to find a single name for it; a name that includes all of the above terms and is 
appropriate not only conceptually, but also historically, if this is indeed a fundamental right 
that goes back in time and is not simply a modern invention. At this point, we need to take a 
step back from the wider philosophical enquiry and focus, instead, once again, on the actual 
origins of the terms we are dealing with. In doing so, we will find that the (relatively 
modern) right to privacy has actually been used by the ECtHR and the SCOTUS to unearth a 
long lost dimension of the (classical) right to equality.   
 
B. From Isonomia to Isotimia 
Equality derives from the old French word equalité (nowadays, égalité).116 The word 
equalité, in turn, comes from the Latin word aequalitas with means ‘equality, similarity, 
uniformity’.117 This short etymological analysis reveals the core ideal that has been 
perceived traditionally as the basis of equality: the need to treat those who are in a similar 
position in a uniform manner. Such a conception of equality is indeed a valuable way of 
guaranteeing impartially and freedom from arbitrariness by maintaining consistent 
treatment as a matter of form. But this formal understanding of equality does remain 
                                                          
112 See Jessica Wolfendale, ‘Moral Security’, (2017) 25 The Journal of Political Philosophy 238 at 244. 
113 See ibid. at 251-255 for an argument along the same lines.   
114 See Christine Goodwin, supra n 108 at paras 86-88. 
115 Ibid. at paras 76-79 and 89. 
116 See Online Etymology Dictionary: https://www.etymonline.com/word/equality [Last accessed 17 
September 2018]. 
117 See Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary (1879) available online at 




incomplete unless we agree on what is the standard in relation to which such treatment is 
to happen. The answer, therefore, as to the actual meaning of equality must be found 
somewhere beyond the term itself. In this regard, it is quite helpful to travel further back in 
time to find the Greek ancestor of aequalitas; that is, isotis (ἰσότης). If we engage with any 
dictionary of the ancient Greek language, we are immediately struck by the simple 
realisation that isotis is a root word leading to many derivative terms, when combined with 
other words denoting specific interests.118 Of these derivative terms, the most prevalent 
one has been isonomia (ἰσονομία) which means ‘equality of political rights’.119 Isonomia 
derives from the word isos (equal) and nomos (law) and has also found its way into the 
dictionaries of the English language as isonomy, i.e. equality before the law.120 
     The significance of the notion of isonomia radiates, of course, far beyond the pages of 
dictionaries of ancient Greek or modern English. Article 14 ECHR provides that ‘[t]he 
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without 
discrimination …’; in other words, it guarantees equality before the law of the European 
Convention. By the same token, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the US Constitution stipulates that ‘[n]o State shall … deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws’. The way the right to equality is set out in these 
prominent documents of western civil rights culture demonstrates quite clearly that the 
notion of equality before the law has been the dominant understanding of equality. The law 
itself must not make arbitrary distinctions based on personal characteristics, nor should the 
law be applied differently to similarly situated people. The law must be impartial and 
consistent in the distribution of rights and burdens. Such assertions echo quite strongly the 
morality of modern democratic societies. But this does not mean that they exhaust the 
meaning of equality. 
     Another important term, derived from the same root, has been the one of isotimia 
(ἰσοτιμία), composed of the words isos (equal) and timi (honour, esteem).121 The person 
enjoying isotimia is called isotimos and is defined as one who is ‘held in equal honour’ and 
maintains ‘equality of privilege’.122 This state of affairs alludes to a kind of equality that is 
not based on form, but on substance, focusing on equal standing rather than on consistency 
in treatment. Isotimia is concerned with the intrinsic status of being seen as an equal, while 
isonomia refers to the extrinsic attribute of being treated equally in the distribution of 
rights. To further illustrate this point, it is worth delving a bit deeper into the word nomos 
(law) which derives from the verb nemo (νέμω), meaning to deal out, dispense, distribute.123 
In fact, an alternative meaning for the word isonomia is ‘equal distribution’.124 Hence, for 
example, in a conversation one is treated with isonomia when he is allowed to speak as 
much the other, but one is treated with isotimia when he can ‘converse with him as his 
equal’.125 The former term is mostly quantitative, implying equal portion in the distribution 
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of something, while the latter is mostly qualitative, denoting equal esteem in dealing with 
somebody.  
     The fact that isonomia found its way into modern English while isotimia was lost in 
translation is not really surprising. First of all, as already mentioned, the equal application of 
the laws is an indisputably important element of maintaining impartiality and freedom from 
arbitrary treatment in a democratic society. Second, equal treatment in the sense of 
applying rights and duties in a consistent manner, without unjustified distinctions, is more 
specific and easier to grasp than the need to guarantee equal honour and to pursue 
recognition of everyone as an equal. Third, again in terms of complexity, while equality 
before the law is inherently ‘vertical’ in its application, equality of honour does possess a 
strong ‘horizontal’ dimension in that recognition –or negation- of honour takes place not 
only in the eyes of the law, but also in the attitudes of other individuals. These practical 
difficulties in the definition and implementation of isotimia seem to provide a reasonable 
explanation of why the ancient isotis turned out to be equated in modern times only with 
isonomia and equal treatment. Nevertheless, even though words might be lost in time, their 
meaning persists. This much is shown from the interaction between equality and privacy in 
human rights adjudication, as described so far. 
     The right to choose as an element of the right to privacy has been strongly correlated, as 
already discussed, with notions such as the ones of ‘moral security’ or ‘equal citizenship’. 
This state of affairs is naturally perplexing as it forces us to stand between equality and 
privacy without a clear explanation as to what it is we are dealing with. The point to be 
advanced here is that what we are facing when we engage with the decisional dimension of 
the right to privacy is often our claim to isotimia, our desire to be recognised in law and in 
fact as being our own masters in making important decisions regarding our own life, our 
demand to stand on an equal footing with others in society when reaching such decisions 
and not to suffer social oppression as a result of doing so. When Mr Dudgeon or Mr 
Lawrence protested their freedom to engage in the sexual conduct they wished without fear 
of prosecution, in reality, they stood for their right not to be treated as lesser individuals 
because of adverse social norms such as prejudice and stereotyping. Under this light, the 
decisional dimension of privacy is in reality the normative laboratory through which the 
ECtHR and the SCOTUS brought into existence a dimension of equality that was not 
reflected in the equality provisions of the respective documents they interpret; that is, 
isotimia. The final subsection will further illustrate the validity of this assertion with 
reference to the issue of legal recognition of same-sex relationships. 
 
 
C. From privacy to equality through isotimia 
In June 2015, in the case of Obergefell v Hodges,126 the SCOTUS famously held that same-sex 
marriage is to be allowed and recognised by all States on an equal footing with different-sex 
marriage, by virtue of the liberty protected by the due process clause as well as the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution. In doing so, the 
opinion of the court emphasised that marriage is ‘a key stone’ of the social order and ‘a 
building block’ of the national community, a ‘constellation of benefits’ having been linked to 
it by the States.127 The harm suffered by same-sex couples as a result of their exclusion from 
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such an institution consisted of ‘more than just material burdens’.128 The SCOTUS pointed 
out that ‘[i]t demeans gays and lesbians for the State to lock them out of a central 
institution of the Nation’s society’.129 In the course of the judgment, the SCOTUS also 
emphasised the ‘profound’130 connection between the equal protection clause and the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, tracing it through a series of cases, 
culminating in Lawrence. The SCOTUS also drew a parallel with Lawrence noting that, in 
being denied the right to marry, same-sex couples were once again faced with ‘a long 
history of disapproval’ which inflicted ‘a grave and continuing harm’, imposing a ‘disability 
on gays and lesbians [that] serve[d] to disrespect and subordinate them’.131 Lack of equal 
respect and the resulting infliction of moral harm and social oppression seem to have 
created the intersection between the equal protection clause and the due process clause, 
i.e. between equality and liberty. 
     In essence, the SCOTUS in Obergefell carried on from Lawrence in continuing ‘a narrative 
in which due process and equal protection, far from having separate missions and entailing 
different inquiries, are profoundly interlocked in a legal double helix’.132 Justice Kennedy -
who delivered the opinion of the court both in Lawrence and in Obergefell- described that 
legal double helix in his closing statement for the latter case as a claim ‘for equal dignity in 
the eyes of the law’.133  Hard as it might be to provide an exhaustive definition of the notion 
of ‘equal dignity’, it might reasonably be said that it refers to the equal measure in which all 
individuals are entitled to autonomy in developing their identity and their role in society, 
without undue interferences by the State.134 This is far from being simply a right to be left 
alone or a right to be treated similarly to those in a similar position. Furthermore, marriage 
is a social institution and the act of getting married is anything but private in terms of its 
effects on the social and the legal status of the couple. By the same token, same-sex couples 
are anything but similar to different-sex couples in terms of their sexual orientation, nor is 
marriage traditionally understood as being an institution that is open to heterosexual and 
homosexual couples alike. Still, all are equal in their need to be treated as respected 
members of a society, possessing equal standing to participate in its institutions.  
     Nevertheless, it does remain conceptually perplexing to argue -as the majority did in 
Obergefell- that ‘equal dignity’ can stand to describe a specific right, to the necessary 
exclusion of other rights.135 Besides, freedom to choose how to proceed with one’s personal 
development is no less attached to the concept of dignity than is freedom from torture, 
freedom from slavery, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of expression, 
freedom of assembly and so on. Instead, it is far more practical to recognise that the right to 
equality itself can accommodate what is being described as equal dignity, the word ‘equal’ 
                                                          
128 Ibid. at 172. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid. at 173. 
131 Ibid. at 175. 
132 See Laurence H. Tribe, supra n 92 at 1898. 
133 Obergefell, supra n 126 at 178. 
134 See Laurence H. Tribe, ‘Equal Dignity: Speaking its Name’ (2015) 129 Harvard Law Review Forum 16 at 22. 
For a wider discussion of the complexities involved in employing the concept of dignity in legal discourse, see 
Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2008) 19 The European 
Journal of International Law at 655; also see David Feldman, ‘Human Dignity as a Legal Value: Part 1’ (1999) 
Public Law at 682. 
135 The same applies to employing other notions, such as the one of ‘anti-subordination liberty’ in describing 
the approach that prevailed in Obergefell and Lawrence: see Kenji Yoshino, ‘A New Birth of Freedom?: 
Obergefell v. Hodges’, (2015) 129 Harvard Law Review 147 at 174.  
21 
 
being added next to the notion of dignity simply with a view to reasserting its own 
normative identity through it; that is, to extend beyond isonomia. Same-sex couples should 
have the right to marry because this is in line with the requirement of making sure that 
everyone is treated with equal honour as a member of society and that, as long as there is 
no disproportionate interference with the rights of others or the State as a whole, everyone 
should be equally capable to fall in love, engage in sexual relationships and, if he or she so 
wishes, get married. Past or current attitudes stemming from prejudice, stereotyping or lack 
of accommodation should never be considered valid reasons for qualifying that fundamental 
right to isotimia. The ECtHR is further away than the SCOTUS from clearly acknowledging 
this dimension of equality as something separate from the right to private life.  
     Only a month after Obergefell, the ECtHR found in the case of Oliari and Others v Italy136 
that Article 8 ECHR alone entailed a positive obligation for member States to provide a 
specific legal framework for the recognition of same-sex unions, considering it, once again, 
unnecessary to examine the claim brought under Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8. It is 
true that Article 8 ECHR played an important role in the emergence of a substantive 
understanding of equality within the case law of the ECtHR.137 Nevertheless, to insist on 
Article 8 and on the notions of respect for private and family life alone as a terrain for 
debating the issue of recognition of same sex marriage is to conflate the means through 
which such a substantive conception of equality came about with the conception itself. 
Besides, it is fair to argue that, not only did an equality analysis played a role in not 
examining the Article 14 claim, but, in fact, the decision of the ECtHR to rely solely on Article 
8 ECHR was strongly influenced by isonomia, the dimension of equality as impartiality which 
requires sameness in the treatment of similarly situated individuals. To understand why this 
is so, we will have to delve a bit deeper into the possible reasons why the ECtHR preferred 
not to review the claim under Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 ECHR. 
     First, it is interesting to note that if the defending State did have a system of civil 
partnerships in place that was made available only to different-sex couples, but not to 
same-sex couples, the ECtHR would not hesitate to find a violation of Article 14 in 
conjunction with Article 8 ECHR, as it has done in the past.138 Second, we need to remember 
that in Oliari, the defending State had not established an effective system of civil 
partnerships at all. Thus, as the only form of legal recognition available to heterosexual 
couples in this case was marriage, the ECtHR in Oliari would have to consider extending the 
right to marry to homosexual couples. But that would be practically impossible as the ECtHR 
still interprets the right to marry as referring only to heterosexual couples.139 This would 
lead to a paradox whereby the ECtHR would be incapable of extending the same benefit 
(right to marry) to homosexual couples despite having already established ‘that same-sex 
couples are just as capable as different-sex couples of entering into stable, committed 
relationships [and, accordingly, that] they are in a relevantly similar situation to a different-
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sex couple as regards their need for legal recognition and protection of their relationship’.140 
It appears then that, by opting to examine the claim under Article 8 ECHR alone, the ECtHR 
managed to evade the issue of equal distribution by focusing entirely on the issue of equal 
recognition; in other words, it bypassed the formal requirements of isonomia to achieve 
isotimia. 
     A similar point can be made as regards the decision of the SCOTUS in Lawrence. The 
majority were concerned that if they invalidated the statute under the equal protection 
clause ‘some might question whether a prohibition would be valid if drawn differently, say, 
to prohibit the conduct both between same-sex and different-sex participants’.141 With a 
view to avoiding this possible levelling down, the opinion of the court emphasised the 
synergy between ‘the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the 
substantive guarantee of liberty’ and the equal protection clause;142 but it only relied on the 
former to strike down the statute at hand. Thus, by letting go of the dialectics of equal 
treatment, the SCOTUS avoided the issue of levelling down and it also enabled itself to 
examine directly the substantive inequality at hand, that is, the ‘stigma’ imposed by the 
impugned criminal statute.143 Once again, then, privacy was used to sidestep the formal 
limitations of isonomia in order to secure isotimia. 
     The ECtHR noted in Oliari that there was ‘a conflict between the social reality of the 
applicants, who for the most part live their relationship openly in Italy, and the law, which 
gives them no official recognition on the territory’.144 Moreover, it reaffirmed, in the same 
way the SCOTUS did in Obergefell, that this state of affairs also led to immaterial harm 
which should be addressed. Accordingly, imposing a positive obligation to set in place an 
effective system of legal recognition would help cultivate ‘a sense of legitimacy to same-sex 
couple’ which has ‘an intrinsic value for persons in the applicants’ position, irrespective of 
the legal effects, however narrow or extensive, that they would produce …’.145 This is a 
deeply relational and extrovert conception of privacy which spells the equality interest at 
hand quite clearly. It highlights the need for everybody to be treated as an equally 
honourable member of society, even if they are not to receive the exact same treatment. It 
also contributes in bringing about social change, thereby helping to disprove the critique 
that privacy can in fact perpetuate inequalities by requiring non-interference with existing 
structures of power within the private sphere.146 Privacy in this context is just another name 
for equality and, more specifically, for isotimia.    
     The SCOTUS and the ECtHR have been on a parallel (albeit not identical) path in 
promoting the legal recognition of same-sex relations.147 The existence of an informal 
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dialogue is hard to deny if we consider, for instance, that the judgment of the ECtHR in 
Dudgeon was expressly mentioned by the SCOTUS in Lawrence; and Lawrence, in turn, was 
relied upon in Obergefell, which, again, was taken into account by the ECtHR in Oliari.148 But 
it is also important to recognise that from Dudgeon and Lawrence to Obergefell and Oliari, 
the two courts have in reality developed a similar philosophy in dealing with the interaction 
between the right to equality and the right to privacy. That philosophy has received many 
names, as previously pointed out, but in reality a simple term suffices to describe it and to 
reveal it as a distinct, neglected dimension of the right to equality that was simply 
rediscovered through the right to privacy. Isotimia helps us understand better the true 
nature of the relationship between the right to equality and the right to privacy. Even as an 
element of the right to privacy -as is currently often perceived- it can help us draw a 
distinction as to how we approach cases of decisional privacy where we take social 
oppression to be a central consideration (isotimia) and those where we consider other 
factors to be pivotal in restricting our freedom of choice.149 
     Most importantly, isotimia provides a solid conceptual platform upon which we can 
continue to develop our understanding of how inequalities are best approached and tackled 
in human rights adjudication. Acknowledging that the wider notion of equality is in fact 
indicative of more than one equalities and applying this finding to the adjudication of 
equality claims increases order and coherence in identifying the protected interest at hand 
and, by necessary implication, in dealing with conflicting interests. Other essential issues 
may also be resolved. For instance, the argument can be put forward that distinguishing 
between ‘formal’ and ‘substantive’ equality is a rather awkward way of addressing the two 
concepts in that it runs the danger of downplaying the significance of the former against the 
latter. In distinguishing between isonomia as indicative of the formal dimension and isotimia 
as indicative of (at least part of) the substantive dimension, we can achieve an ‘equality of 
terms’, by removing the implication that one of them lacks ‘substance’. Besides, to pursue 
equality by securing rationality and impartiality in treatment is no less important than to 
seek equality by guaranteeing equal honour and autonomy. Such an increase in precision 
and clarity is particularly important in the context of adjudication of human rights claims. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Equality and privacy are conceptual labyrinths within which one might get easily lost. But if 
we look carefully we will notice there is a pathway leading to each other. This can be 
summarised as the right to choose how to lead one’s life without undue interferences 
stemming from social oppression in the form of prejudice, stereotyping and lack of 
reasonable accommodation. This is a requirement that is part of both the right to equality 
and of the right to privacy, at least at a conceptual level. Various instances of the case-law of 
the ECtHR and the SCOTUS on the legal treatment of same-sex relationships emphasise this 
synergy between equality and privacy at a more practical level as well. Indeed, the reality 
seems to be that both courts have used the right to privacy in order to promote equality 
interests, even though they have not always clearly acknowledged this to be the case. The 
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resulting reliance on relatively unclear terms such as ‘personal liberty’, ‘personal 
development’, ‘moral security’ or ‘equal dignity’ does not serve to maintain conceptual 
clarity. Moreover, focusing on privacy alone might serve to undermine the role of equality in 
human rights adjudication by downplaying its importance and by preventing it from 
stretching beyond its formal facet. 
     By distinguishing between isonomia and isotimia as two of the most basic manifestations 
of equality, and by acknowledging the prominent role that the former has played 
traditionally in human rights adjudication as opposed to the latter, we can acquire a better 
understanding of the reasons why privacy was used over equality in tackling issues related 
to the legal protection of same-sex couples. This is so because the said distinction allows us 
to observe that privacy has been employed as a conceptual laboratory within which the 
separation of isonomia from isotimia was achieved, or to be more accurate, rediscovered. 
Accordingly, it may fairly be argued that what we have been dealing with in many of the 
cases discussed above has been equality as isotimia, but masked as privacy. The notion of 
isotimia is particularly useful not only in eloquently capturing the claims brought forward 
when a person is rendered less capable of making a valuable choice by virtue of social 
oppression; it also serves to denote that such claims are in fact based on an understanding 
of equality as equal honour that is no less ‘classical’, in terms of its origin, than the one that 
is based on consistency in treatment, also known as isonomia.   
     Freedom from torture is not the same as freedom of expression, even though they are 
both freedoms. By the same token, equality in treatment (isonomia) is not the same as 
equality in honour (isotimia), even though they are both equalities. While the former notion 
has been the dominant paradigm in the theory and practice of equality, this paper has 
aimed to suggest that the latter notion is at least as important and has been acknowledged 
as such, albeit not properly. The conflation of isotimia with the decisional dimension of the 
right to privacy has delivered a great service in helping the ECtHR and the SCOTUS highlight 
the importance of this alternate dimension of equality. Safeguarding the private sphere 
within which same-sex relationships can flourish without fear of suffering the effects of 
social oppression proved to be an ideal terrain for that process. But the time has come to 
unravel the knot created by equality and privacy in more express terms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
